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Abstract
This research paper serves as a case study, providing an updated history of the
American opioid crisis through the lens of OxyContin and Purdue Pharma. In 1996 the
long-acting opioid OxyContin was approved by the Food and Drug Administration and
became the most prescribed Schedule II narcotic by 2001. Prescription guidelines from
the World Health Organization show that opioid prescription before 1996 was limited
primarily to those who were terminally ill or suffering severe pain. This paper will show
how Purdue Pharma successfully manipulated the medical outlook on pain and opioids
in an attempt to streamline OxyContin for mild pain. From sales representatives with
uncapped salary incentives to all-expense-paid 5-star symposiums, millions of dollars
were spent sponsoring renowned pain management doctors and pain societies. Using
leaked budget reports, this paper outlines Purdue Pharma's successful strategy to
convince doctors that OxyContin was to be marketed heavily for long-term pain use for
patients with Osteoarthritis. This paper also carefully analyzes patient pamphlets and
medical journal advertisements showing unsubstantiated and illegal claims that
surfaced regularly in the late 1990s. Data from The Center for Disease Control shows
that from 1996 to 2021 over 500,000 Americans have died from Opioid-related
overdoses with over 100,000 deaths alone during the current pandemic. Government
court hearings show a history of delayed federal action that would allow OxyContin to
become the catalyst of today’s opioid epidemic.
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Introduction
In 2001 OxyContin surpassed Viagra as the most prescribed schedule 2 narcotic
in the United States.1 In April 2021, the Centers for Disease Control concluded a report
showing that 100,300 United States citizens died from opioid overdoses in a
twelve-month period. This was the first time in the United States' long history with
opioids that the death toll surpassed 100,000 annually. In the past twenty years, we
have lost over 800,000 citizens to opioids. This epidemic has lowered the CDC life
expectancy by two and a half years, and is responsible for more deaths than shootings
and car crashes combined.2
Understanding this epidemic goes much deeper than observing the death rate
spike over the past twenty years. The United States has a complicated and tragic
history with opioids and the pharmaceutical companies that manufacture them.
America’s first opioid crisis started over 150 years ago when German pharmaceutical
companies, Bayer and Merck, supplied morphine to wounded troops during the Civil
War.3 Morphine proved to be an extremely effective drug, however, the long-term
ramifications of its use were soon felt.
By the turn of the 19th-century, public concern grew, as it was estimated that 1 in
200 Americans were addicted to Morphine. 4 Bayer pharmaceuticals responded to the
morphine addiction crisis by claiming they had a new “wonder drug” that could cure pain
1

Art Van Zee, “The Promotion and Marketing of Oxycontin: Commercial Triumph, Public Health Tragedy,”
American journal of public health (American Public Health Association, February 2009),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2622774/.
2
“Drug Overdose in the U.S. Top 100,000 Annually” National Center for Health Statistics, last modified
November 17th, 2021 https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/nchs_press_releases/2021/20211117.htm
3
Robert Hicks, “Frontline Pharmacies,” Science History Institute, June 8 2011,
https://www.sciencehistory.org/distillations/frontline-pharmacies
4
Erick Trickey, “19th-Century Opiate Addiction,” Smithsonian, January 4, 2018,
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/inside-story-americas-19th-century-opiate-addiction-180967673/
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without causing long-term addiction. The drug's name was Heroin (medically known as
diacetylmorphine) and it was five times more potent than morphine. In 1898, Heroin
could be bought over the counter and was recommended for a wide range of mild
ailments including, coughs, diarrhea, and “hysteria” in women.5 It was not long until
people realized that heroin only made the addiction problem in America worse.
Prior to the 1920s, minimal federal oversight and a lack of restraint from
pharmaceutical companies were responsible for America’s first opioid crisis. In 1924 the
United States made it illegal for the importation of crude opium as well as the selling
and manufacturing of Heroin.6 As heroin was banned from American medicine, it
reinvented itself outside of the pharmaceutical world as a black market drug.7 Opioid
addiction was pushed out to the fringes of society, and weaker opioids became sparsely
prescribed by doctors. By the 1950s pharmaceutical companies continued to make
opioids out of necessity, while turning their attention to other psychoactive drugs
(Valium, Librium, Miltown) for profit.8
It will never be known whether or not Bayer truly believed their non-addictive
“wonder drug” was actually non-addictive. They never had to testify and currently
remain one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the world. The lessons learned
from America's first opioid crisis were important and remained well-heeded for decades.
Legal but highly addictive sedatives became the focus of pharmaceutical companies. A
5

“From Cough Medicine to Deadly Addiction, A Century of Heroin and Drug Abuse-Policy,” Yale School of
Medicine, 1999,
https://medicine.yale.edu/news/yale-medicine-magazine/article/from-cough-medicine-to-deadly-addictiona-century/
6
“History of Heroin,” United Nations, January 1 1953,
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/bulletin/bulletin_1953-01-01_2_page004.html
7
8

““
Patrick Keefe, Empire of Pain: the Secret History of the Sackler Dynasty, New York: Doubleday, 2021.
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line was drawn in American society between “white market” drugs (sedatives, and
tranquilizers) of suburbia and black market drugs (heroin, cocaine, speed) of the
working class.9 It wasn’t till the turn of the 20th century that a brand new “non-addictive”
opioid would surface. One that would recreate an even deadlier opioid crisis.
In 1995, a relatively new pharmaceutical company, Purdue Pharma, secured
FDA patenting for a high-strength opioid named OxyContin. Purdue Pharma utilized a
multipronged campaign from 1996 to 2004 to make OxyContin the most prescribed
schedule 2 drug in America; as evidenced by 1) the use of “revolving door” influence to
secure personal relationiships with FDA employees; 2) promoting false and misleading
opioid addiction data exclusively for OxyContin; 3) funding the creation of fake
grass-roots pain awareness societies; 4) all while deploying a team of sales reps
focused on convincing doctors and patients that OxyContin is “the opioid to start with
and to stay with.”

Historiography
This research entails a new history of Purdue Pharma, OxyContin, and the
Sackler family. As the Sackler family is still awaiting trial, the published research so far
is primarily archived through medical whistleblowers, court filings, and investigative
journal articles. The corroboration between key doctors, lawyers, and journalists
portrays a commonly shared notion that Purdue Pharma acted criminally and
unethically.

9

David Herzberg, “White Market Drugs,” The University Of Chicago Press, 2020
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Dr. Art Van Zee was a family physician in rural Virginia, who witnessed firsthand
the effects OxyContin was having on his patients and community. Dr. Art Van Zee was
one of the very first doctors to blow the whistle against Purdue Pharma in the early
2000s. His PubMed contribution The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial
Triumph, Public Health Tragedy, thoroughly exposed the dangerous opioid and the flawed
claims Purdue Pharma was making to the medical community about its addictiveness.
Dr. Art Van Zee remains the most commonly cited source in the brief literature we have
on the history of OxyContin.
Dr. David Herzberg is a historian who focuses on the legal kind of psychoactive
drugs. Prescription drugs, or as Herzberg calls the “White Market drugs,” have been
entrenched in the sociology and economy of the United States for well over a hundred
years. His 2009 publication Happy Pills in America: From Miltown to Prozac, illuminates

how pharmaceutical advertising preyed on the sociological anxieties of 20th-century
women to successfully promote addictive tranquilizers as a household staple. Dr.
Herzberg’s most recent publication White Market Drugs: Big Pharma and the Hidden
History of Addiction in America, shows us the current state of psychoactive
pharmaceuticals in America. Whether it be tranquilizers, amphetamines, or opioids,
United States pharmaceutical companies have always found ways to make the
abundance of certain addictive prescription drugs widely available.
Most research thus far shows very little debate on Purdue Pharma. Without
having found any case or defense for the campaign of OxyContin, Patrick Radden
Keefe’s Empire of Pain details a more biographical sketch of the Sackler family as
pharmaceutical titans. His depiction of the Sackler family and their contributions to the

8

pharmaceutical world since the mid-1900s provide further context to the motivations and
perceived impunity of many members of the family. Keefe’s research shows us the
complexity of the pharmaceutical industry and the place for potent long-lasting opioids
among terminally ill patients. OxyContin’s predecessor MS Contin was regarded as a
humane discovery for undertreated terminal pain patients. Keefe points out that Purdue
Pharma initially crossed an ethical boundary when they decided to target non-terminal
and moderate pain patients with their new high-powered opioid, OxyContin.

Background:
The Sackler Family

To understand Purdue Pharma’s role in the opioid crisis, it is important to
understand the family behind it. Until recently, the Sackler family was one of the most
prestigious, wealthy, and respected families of New York high society. The family's
patriarch, Arthur Sackler (1913-1987), created a pharmaceutical advertising empire that
was in many ways responsible for the success of some of the largest pharmaceutical
companies to date.
In 1996 the Medical Advertising Hall of Fame was invented. 10 Among the first
inductees was an already deceased man named Arthur M Sackler. His placard still
reads that "No single individual did more to shape the character of medical advertising
than the multi-talented Dr. Arthur Sackler.” 11 Although Arthur was not involved in the
manufacturing of pharmaceuticals, he was responsible for placing them at the center of
American advertising.
10
11

“Medical Advertising Hall of Fame Inductees,” MAHF, https://www.mahf.com/mahf-inductees/
Ibid..
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The oldest of three brothers, Arthur Sackler was a dutiful son of immigrant
parents. Early on in his professional career, he figured out the best way to advertise
pharmaceuticals was to target the doctors themselves. Arthur placed flashy, but clever
ads in his own medical journal The Medical Tribune while paying renowned doctors to
endorse pharmaceuticals amongst their peers.12 This advertising technique was as
massively successful as it was unethical, responsible for turning modest pharmaceutical
companies into international conglomerates. From 1950 to 1956, Pfizer increased their
sales force from 8 to 2,000 employees thanks to Arthur’s ad campaign for their new
antibiotic, Terramycin.13
When Arthur took on Roche Pharmaceuticals as a client in the 60s, tranquilizers
were becoming the primary focus of the pharmaceutical industry. Arthur was hired by
Roche to advertise Librium and Valium. In an ethical conflict of interest, Arthur again
used his own medical journal, The Medical Tribune, to promote these drugs for a
suspiciously wide array of conditions. The two tranquilizers were very similar in
chemistry but were strategically advertised so they wouldn't contradict the sales of each
other. Arthur aggressively advertised Roche’s tranquilizers to women. Historian Andrea
Tone noted in the Age of Anxiety, “What Roches tranquilizers really seemed to offer was
a quick fix for the problem of being female.”14 Valium would become the first
pharmaceutical ever to reach 100 million dollars in sales while Librium remained a top 5
seller in the United States during the 60s and 70s. Roche became the most successful
pharmaceutical company in the world as Valium remained the most prescribed drug

12

Patrick Keefe, Empire of Pain the Secret History of the Sackler Dynasty, New York: Doubleday, 2021.
Ibid..
14
Andrea Tone, The Age of Anxiety a History of America's Turbulent Affair with Tranquilizers (New York:
Basic Books, 2009).
13
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through 1982.15 Unfortunately, none of the advertisements informed patients that valium
and Librium were physically and psychologically addicting.
Valium turned Arthur Sackler into one of the richest philanthropists of New York
City. By the time of his passing in 1987, the Sackler name was synonymous with
museum wings and placards more than it was with tranquilizers and addiction. He
shared much of his wealth with his two younger brothers, Mortimer and Raymond. All
three spread the family wealth into many different ventures including the acquisition of a
small-scale drug company named Purdue Frederick.
When Purdue Frederick was purchased, the company was put under his brothers
Raymond and Mortimer’s purview. In the 1960s and 70s, the company had moderate
success manufacturing Betadine (a sterilizer), laxatives, and even a product that
specialized in ear wax removal. Arthur's nephew Richard Sackler, shortened the
company name to Purdue Pharma in 1993 while the company was testing a
“revolutionary” new opioid OxyContin. With reverence to his uncle and families legacy,
he declared the name change was needed to “take on the risk of new products.”16
Purdue Pharma’s campaign to promote OxyContin was even more unethical, illegal,
and deadlier than any of Arthur’s endeavors as it ultimately ignited the opioid crisis we
live in today.

15

Written by: American Addiction Centers Editorial StaffEdited by: Amanda LautieriLast updated on
January 4, 2022{ "@context": "http://www.schema.org". “Valium Facts, History and Statistics: Dangers
and Legality.” DrugAbuse.com, January 5, 2022.
https://drugabuse.com/benzodiazepines/valium/history-and-statistics/.
16

Patrick Keefe, Empire of Pain the Secret History of the Sackler Dynasty, New York: Doubleday, 2021.
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Good Intentions
Opioids are naturally occurring alkaloids in the poppy plant. Opioid cultivation can
be traced thousands of years back to the Sumerians.17 The poppy plant (scientifically
known as Papaver somniferum) contains alkaloids such as Codein, Thebain, and
Morphine. Each of these opioids varies in strength and are responsible for inducing a
euphoric sense of well-being and pain relief. Pharmaceutical companies as well as
black market manufacturers cultivate these opioid alkaloids from the poppy plant and
process them for human consumption. Although Opioids remain a medical necessity for
pain relief, the misuse and abuse of opioids commonly leads to addiction and overdose.
The Center For Disease Control still recommends that patients who are
experiencing chronic pain should receive the lowest effective dose of an immediate
opioid (codeine, Vicodin, Percocet) for the shortest period of time.18 This is a short-term
solution for patients who received an injury or completed an operation. If followed
correctly it mitigates the risk of addiction while avoiding unnecessary suffering to the
patient. The terminally ill is the only category of patients where stronger opioids
(OxyContin, Morphine, Fentanyl) are recommended.19
As mentioned previously, Doctors in the mid-20th century were trepidatious in
prescribing opioids to patients due to the opioid crisis of the 19th and early 20th
centuries. While this method was successful at keeping opioid addiction on the fringes
of society, it left many terminally ill patients in a state of inhumane suffering. In 1976,
physician Cicely Saunders wrote a revolutionary book, “The Care of Dying,” blowing the
17

David Egilmen, “The Marketing of OxyContin®: A Cautionary Tale,” Indian Journal of Medical Ethics
(Indian Journal of Medical Ethics, August 8, 2019),
18
“Guidelines for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain Factsheet,” accessed March 4, 2022,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/prescribing/Guidelines_Factsheet-a.pdf.
19
“---”
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whistle on the standardized and inhumane treatment of the terminally ill. Dr. Saunders
founded hospice, realizing that patients didn’t want to spend their last days in a sterile
hospital bed, tethered to a morphine drip.20 Cicely’s work initially inspired Richard
Sackler to pivot Purdue Frederick into pain management for the terminally ill.
Richard Sackler, and his cousin Kathleen Sackler, began researching a
long-acting and orally administered version of morphine. If a cancer patient could
swallow a morphine pill that lasted 12 hours, terminally ill patients would no longer be
dependent on nurses and hospitals for the pain management aspect of their treatment.
In 1980 a Sackler pharmaceutical research subsidiary named Napp labs delivered on
Richard’s request with Continus.21 Continus, later known as Contin, is a pill coating that
allowed high dosages of morphine (and later OxyCodone) to slowly absolve into the
bloodstream. The new drug was named MS Contin, British and American medical
societies (M.S Contin received FDA approval in 1984) appraised the drug as a major
step forward for terminal pain patients. MS Contin’s annual sales peaked at 400 million
dollars annually, steering Richard Sackler and Purdue Frederick away from the old days
of laxatives and Betadine.22 M.S Contin didn’t face the backlash that its successor
OxyContin would because it was marketed appropriately to the dying. When Purdue
Fredrick's patent on MS Contin expired, Richard Sackler and Purdue Fredrick patented
OxyContin. This new “wonder drug” was much more powerful than MS Contin and
marketed well beyond the terminally ill.

20

David Clark, Cicely Saunders: Founder of the Hospice Movement Selected Letters 1959-1999 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005).
21
Patrick Keefe, Empire of Pain the Secret History of the Sackler Dynasty, New York: Doubleday, 2021.
22
Ibid..
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What Is OxyContin?
The main opioid agonist in OxyContin is OxyCodone. Purdue Pharma did not
invent OxyCodone, as it was already available in smaller quantities as Percocet or
Percadon prior to OxyContins release. OxyCodone itself is twice as potent as morphine,
which was the primary opioid agonist in MS Contin. Although OxyCodone is more
potent than morphine, its reputation wasn’t synonymous with addiction in America
before the 21st century. This is largely because it was not medicinally available in the
United States until 1939, a time when doctors were hesitant to prescribe opioids. The
OxyCodone that was available, in Percocet and Percadon, was usually sold in a
5-milligram pill that contained a large quantity of acetaminophen, better known as
Tylenol. The low dosage of OxyCodone that was infrequently prescribed did not bolster
much concern from medical watchdogs and government bureaus. The amount of
OxyCodone contained in a single OxyContin pill went up to 80 milligrams. Although the
Contin contained in each pill delayed absorption into the bloodstream, it would become
ineffective if the coating of the pill was tampered with in any way. If an 80 milligram
OxyContin was chewed, dissolved in water, or crushed, the patient would be essentially
taking the equivalent of sixteen Percocet (or all 80 mg) at once.
Like MS Contin, the delayed absorption of OxyContin advertised that patients
would experience up to 12 hours of pain relief per pill. When a pain patient takes an
instant release Percocet the effects usually last up to 4 to 6 hours before it wears off.
OxyContin was promoted as the “easiest way” for pain relief as a patient would only
have to take one pill twice a day for effective 24-hour pain relief.

14

Part 1:The FDA
the Revolving Door
Big Pharma’s revenue stream for a new drug is controlled by two factors, the
FDA approval of a drug, and its patenting. When a pharmaceutical company proposes a
new drug they immediately patent it, allowing them to become the sole manufacturers of
the drug for around 20 years. This gives the company a limited time to make a huge
profit before the patent expires and competitors make cheaper, generic versions of the
same drug. By the late 1980’s Purdue Frederick’s patent on MS Contin was running out.
With MS Contin going generic, Purdue Frederick risked losing up to 400 million dollars a
year in revenue.23 Richard Sackler proposed OxyContin mitigate that loss and turn the
newly renamed Purdue Pharma into a major pharmaceutical conglomerate.
When a pharmaceutical company patents a new drug like OxyContin it usually
takes multiple years for the FDA to license the drug. As the FDA is operated on a
government budget, pharmaceutical companies have to pay for the lengthy and costly
trials of the drugs on review.24 Many companies will spend hundreds of millions of
dollars over a multiple-year timeline, only to have the FDA deny their application. It is
then up to the drugs that pass the FDA review board to make up the revenue for its own
trial expenses before its patent wears off.

23

Patrick Keefe, Empire of Pain the Secret History of the Sackler Dynasty, New York: Doubleday, 2021.
“CDER 21st Century Review Process.” FDA.GOV. FDA. Accessed March 3, 2022.
https://www.fda.gov/media/78941/download#:~:text=The%20timelines%20for%20NMEs%20and,of%20su
bmission%20of%20the%20application).
24
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When OxyContin was being reviewed by the FDA, Curtis Wright was the medical
reviewer and chief inquisitor in charge.25 Patrick Keefe states in Empire of Pain that “At
times, it could seem that Wright had given up his role as an impartial federal regulator
and became a sort of in-house advocate for Purdue.” During the trial period, Purdue
pharma proposed that with the slow release method of OxyContin, the patient would
less likely succumb to addiction. The data for this was flawed and misrepresented but
would later come to be the foundation on which OxyContin was marketed on. In 1995
Wright approved of Oxycontin only 11 months after it was submitted for review.
If a drug is allowed to come to market, there are multiple other safeguards that
the FDA must continue to watch over. The first is the package insert attached to each
prescription bottle. This informs the patient of the potential risks associated with the
drug they are taking. Curtis Wright approved of a low-risk package insert that reads
“iatrogenic ‘addiction’ to opioids legitimately used in the management of pain is very
rare.”26 From OxyContin’s public release in 1996 to 2001, pain patients were misguided
into believing that there was little to no risk of opioid dependency, as long as they were
taking OxyContin as prescribed. In 2001 the FDA mandated that Purdue replace “very
rare” with “data are not available to establish the true incidence of addiction.”27
Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act and implementing regulations, “the
FDA regulates the advertising and promotion of prescription drugs and is responsible for
25

David Egilmen, “The Marketing of OxyContin®: A Cautionary Tale,” Indian Journal of Medical Ethics
(Indian Journal of Medical Ethics, August 8, 2019),
https://ijme.in/articles/the-marketing-of-oxycontin-a-cautionary-tale/?galley=html.
26
David Egilmen, “The Marketing of OxyContin®: A Cautionary Tale,” Indian Journal of Medical Ethics
(Indian Journal of Medical Ethics, August 8, 2019),
https://ijme.in/articles/the-marketing-of-oxycontin-a-cautionary-tale/?galley=html.
27
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, “Opioid Timeline,” U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
accessed April 4, 2022.
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/information-drug-class/timeline-selected-fda-activities-and-significant-events-ad
dressing-opioid-misuse-and-abuse.
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ensuring that prescription drug advertising and promotion are truthful, balanced, and
accurately communicated.”28 Unfortunately, for the first five years of OxyContin’s
release, there were only 39 FDA employees tasked to investigate ethical
pharmaceutical promotion. In the year 2002 alone these 39 members of the FDA were
tasked with 34,000 separate documents of promotional material. Even after Curtis
Wright’s departure from the FDA, Purdue Pharma deliberately took advantage of the
administration's lack of resources releasing 15,000 instructional videos to licensed
physicians without FDA approval. 29 In a method that bears resemblance to Arthur
Sackler’s advertising tactics, Purdue pharma printed multiple OxyContin ads in medical
journals without approval. It took six years for the FDA to finally catch up with Purdue
Pharma’s promotional materials, however, Purdue didn’t face much legal action besides
the discontinuation of a few advertisements.
Much of Curtis Wright’s personal correspondence with Purdue has been kept
confidential in federal court. The facts are that OxyContin’s main opioid alkaloid
contains OxyCodone, an opioid that is twice the strength of Morphine and therefore MS
Contin. Curtis recommended this drug be approved for chronic to moderate pain
patients, ultimately giving the legal go-ahead for Purdue to expand far past the
terminally ill market. Two years after OxyContin was passed, Curtis Wright left the
federal government for a higher paying salary at Purdue Pharma.

28

Art Van Zee, “The Promotion and Marketing of Oxycontin: Commercial Triumph, Public Health Tragedy,”
American journal of public health , February 20 09
\https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2622774/.
29
Ibid..
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Part 2: The Campaign
The Portenoy effect:
Despite OxyContin’s FDA approval in 1995, Richard Sackler realized he had a
long way to go in convincing the American public that OxyContin was safe. It was at this
point Richard and the remaining Sackler family members on the Purdue board realized
that the best way to go forward was to look back. OxyContin would not only need to be
advertised straight to doctors via medical journals, but it would need to be marketed as
the next non-addictive “wonderdrug.”
Dr. Russel Portenoy was a renowned young neuroscientist before he was
approached by Richard Sackler and Purdue Pharma. By his 30s, he was already a
professor of neurology at Cornell University and was one of the first doctors to focus on
pain as his primary topic of study. Pain is a medical subject that many doctors steered
clear of practicing as it is subjective and can’t be measured on any kind of reliable
scale. He claimed, “that opioids bared an unfair taint because of concerns about their
addictive properties and this had discouraged generations of doctors from employing
what might be the best and most effective therapy for the treatment of pain.”30 Forbes
listed Portenoy as the “The King of Pain” in the 1990s, he was president of the
American Pain Society, the American Pain foundation, and also was a chairman of the
Department of Pain Medicine and Palliative Care at Beth Isreal Hospital in New York
City.31

30
31

Patrick Keefe, Empire of Pain the Secret History of the Sackler Dynasty New York: Doubleday, 2021.
“King of Pain.” Forbes, September 20, 1999.
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Purdue Pharma and Dr. Russel Portenoy had a coincidence of interests when it
came to their fields. Purdue Pharma donated millions of dollars to Dr. Portenoy’s clinics
as he championed the wonders of opioid use in pain management. Portenoy spoke at
many Purdue Sponsored galas coining the phrase “opiophobia” among his medical
peers. “Opiophobia” was a term invented to convince doctors that their fear of
prescribing opioids was irrational.32
To back up “opiophobia” Dr. Portenoy and Purdue Pharma used an outdated and
misrepresented study in the New England Medical Journal. The Porter and Jick study
took place in 1980 with no affiliation to Purdue Pharma or pharmaceutical promotion.
The entire crux of Purdue Pharma’s campaign to market OxyContin was initially reliant
on “less than one percent become addicted,” the misquote reads as follows:
“To the Editor: Recently, we examined our current files to determine the incidence of
narcotic addiction in 39,946 hospitalized medical patients who were monitored
consecutively. Although there were 11,882 patients who received at least one narcotic
preparation, there were only four cases of reasonably well-documented addiction in
patients who had no history of addiction. The addiction was considered major in only
one instance. The drugs implicated were meperidine in two patients, Percodan in one,
and hydromorphone in one. We conclude that despite widespread use of narcotic drugs
in hospitals, the development of addiction is rare in medical patients with no history of
addiction.”33

32

David Egilmen, “The Marketing of OxyContin®: A Cautionary Tale,” Indian Journal of Medical Ethics
(Indian Journal of Medical Ethics, August 8, 2019)
33
Porter J, Jick H. Addiction rare in patients treated with narcotics. N Engl J Med 1980;302:123.
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Dr. Portenoy and Purdue pharma ignored that these patients were taking small
dosages of opioids for a short period of time and were all under the direct supervision of
a hospital.34 Only 450 of these 11,882 patients were taking a product that contained
OxyCodone. One of the patients that resulted in “major” abuse was taking Percodan, a
pill that has a maximum of only 10mg of OxyCodone to OxyContin’s 80 mg pills. In a
2012 interview with The Wall Street Journal, Dr. Russell Portenoy stated “I gave
innumerable lectures in the ’80s and 0’s about addiction that wasn’t true… did I teach
about pain management, specifically about opioid therapy, in a way that reflects
misinformation? I guess I did.”35

Grass Roots or AstroTurf?
When OxyContin came to market in 1996 Purdue Pharma targeted many
patients via pamphlets and brochures under the guise of “Partners Against Pain” (PAP).
“Partners Against Pain,” was fronted as an independent coalition of doctors, patients,
and health care providers, who were all allied in raising pain awareness. Although PAP
seemed like a grassroots venture it was an organization that was funded and created by
Purdue Pharma. Many of the pamphlets were written and signed off by Dr. Russel
Portenoy himself.
PAP was promoted via website and pamphlets that were widely distibuted in
hospitals from 1996 to 2002. Among the literature was a “frequently asked questions
section” that read “Aren’t opioid pain medications like OxyContin® Tablets ‘addicting’?
Even my family is concerned about this.” The pamphlet answered this question by
34
35
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stating that “Drug addiction means using a drug to get “high” rather than to relieve pain.
You are taking opioid pain medication for medical purposes. The medical purposes are
clear and the effects are beneficial, not harmful.”
The promotional OxyContin material in the PAP pamphlets was aggressive,
especially considering the medical climate on opioids before 1996. In 1995 Dr. John
Campbell, a peer of Russell Portnoy and a key figure of the American Pain Society,
labeled pain as the 5th vital sign. This was pivotal as it gave doctors a green light on
prescribing pain pills like you would a blood pressure medication. The invention of “The
5th Vital sigh” allowed the previously subjective field of pain to now appear as objective.
Pain became treated as if it were a disease itself.

Part 3:Business Module and Promotion
The Pitch
Purdue was successfully advertising through JAMA (Journal of American
Medicine Association) as well as PAP. Soon after OxyContin’s release Richard Sackler
and Purdue Pharma realized that the best way to get doctors to prescribe as much
OxyContin as possible was to add a personal touch.
Purdue Pharma already had an existing pile of data that showed which doctors
were more inclined to prescribe their previous opioid MS Contin. Leaked budget reports
from the mid to late 1990s show an emphasis on expanding the number of Purdue sales
representatives to target those doctors. Millions of dollars were set aside for Sales Reps
to buy doctors lunch and send them free Purdue Pharma merchandise, which included
OxyContin hats, tertiary chart pens, and more. Purdue representatives had uncapped
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sales bonuses which encouraged them to sell as much OxyContin to doctors as
possible. By 2001, Purdue increased its internal sales force from 318 sales
representatives to 671 with Purdue pharma paying 40 million dollars that year in
employee bonuses.36 The average physician call list went from 30,000 physicians to
94,000 thousand physicians annually in a 5 year period.
Before the OxyContin campaign was launched, it was very rare for primary
physicians to prescribe opioids to their patients. However, the new FDA approval of
OxyContin for non-cancer pain allowed the drug to branch out to any pain patient. Sales
reps were recruited to infiltrate the primary care field, by 2003 nearly half of the
prescriptions for OxyContin were signed by primary care physicians.37
Sales reps were conditioned to parrot the package insert, which had a low risk
and nonaddictive labeling tell 2001. The main objective was to convince that “OxyContin
was the opioid to start with and to stay with.”38 As OxyContin was given FDA approval
for severe to moderate pain, it was the sales reps job to aggressively promote the drug
for both terminal and non-terminal pain. Despite personal check-ins and free
merchandise, sales reps were encouraged to invite as many physicians as possible to
attend all-expense-paid symposiums held by Purdue Pharma.
From 1996 to 2001 Purdue Pharma held over 40 symposiums at 5-star resorts in
California, Arizona, and Florida. During that period over 5,000 doctors and nurses
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attended these free of charge.39 These symposiums occurred in a similar manner as an
all-expense paid time-share promotion. Invitees would spend the weekend enjoying all
the food and amenities the 5-star resort would have to offer while setting a few hours
aside to attend a promotional conference for OxyContin.
Renowned doctors such as Dr. Russel Portenoy would give speeches about the
wonders of their new “non-addictive” opioid at these symposiums. When concerned
doctors asked about the addiction aspect of OxyCodone, representatives claimed that
the delayed absorption of OxyCodone into the bloodstream via Contin prohibits the
peaks and troughs of euphoria and therefore addiction. At that time, there was no real
data to indicate that addiction was based on “peaks and troughs” and or waves of
euphoria. The only outsourced addiction data that Purdue did not make up was the
Porter and Jick “less than 1 percent” quote that in itself was taken out of context and
misappropriated. Much later Dr. Herschel Jick would claim that he was “amazed” to the
extent that Purdue used his paragraph of a “minor academic offering” to justify an entire
campaign focused on promoting the use of such a powerful opioid.40
Leaked Budget Reports
Annual budget reports from 1998, 2001, and 2002 show that Purdue Pharma
was complicit in profiteering off of an addictive substance. Each report shows not only
an increase in revenue but an eagerness to continue pushing the drug further down the
line to patients enduring moderate pain such as arthritis. The following sections show
highlighted quotes from each report in chronological order.
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1998:
The 1998 annual budget report labeled weaker opioids like Vicodin and Percocet
as ineffective competitors to OxyContin. Due to the high dosages of Acetaminophen in
weaker opioids (referred to in the report as combination opioids) the report claims that
the “hepatic toxicities” put a ceiling on the amount of pain management a patient could
receive. These “combination opioids” were considered to be the “primary competition for
OxyContin in its position as the opioid to ‘start with’ while treating pain.’’’ 41 Sales
representatives were expected to drive OxyContin’s revenue stream up to “220 million
dollars in factory sales” as well as “continue to expand the use of OxyContin use in the
non-malignant pain market by positioning it as the drug start with.”42

2001:
By 2001 Purdue Pharma surpassed viagra as the most prescribed schedule 2
narcotic in the United States. However, the massive overprescribing of OxyContin was
garnishing attention from the public as well as the US government. The budget report
begins with “in 2000, OxyContin tablets have been under assault due to the media's
reports of diversion.” OxyContin tablets were to continue to be “aggressively promoted
for use in the non-malignant market.” The factory sales goal for the year was set at 1.2
billion dollars. Emphasis was placed on selling to patients with “specific disease
syndromes such as back pain, osteoarthritis, reflex sympathetic dystrophy,
trauma/injury, neuropathic type pains, etc.” Despite the growing rate of public concern
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for OxyContin, addiction, and overdose, Purdue Pharma was hailing its latest release,
the 160 milligram OxyContin tablet.43

2002:
As public awareness of opioid addiction was becoming more prevalent, Purdue
Pharma became focused on damage control. Despite a clear objective to reach 1.2
billion in sales, Purdue Pharma emphasizes the need to “protect our market share from
existing competitors and the negative media.” They planned to achieve this by
supporting “the acceptance of opioids for non-cancer pain through educational and
public relations efforts,” while expanding the use of “OxyContin tablets to patients with
moderate to severe pain of an extended duration due to osteoarthritis and diabetic
neuropathy.44
The 2002 budget report continues to stress that “In spite of impending
competitive threats, the future for OxyContin tablets is very bright… Future growth of
OxyContin tablets will be achieved through targeted efforts to penetrate: Primary care,
OB/GYN, Rheumatology, Surgical, Oncology and sports/rehabilitation/physical
medicine.” Purdue continued to fund 2,000,000 for the Partners Against Pain budget
while planning even more symposiums in an effort to “educate” doctors on opioid use.45
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Aftermath
GAO Hearings:
In December of 2003, the United States General Accounting Office sat down with
the DEA, FDA, and Purdue Pharma over growing concerns of OxyContin addiction and
diversion. Due to Purdue Pharma’s aggressive and unethical advertising of OxyContin,
the market for non-cancer OxyContin patients surpassed malignant patients. The DEA
was reporting massive instances of diversion, meaning that the drug was being
tampered with and also had a high potential for black market use. At the same time, the
FDA realized that much of Purdue Pharma’s advertisements in medical journals weren’t
being sent in for approval.
In 1998 Purdue distributed 15,000 copies of an OxyContin video to physicians
without submitting it to FDA for review. This video, entitled “I Got My Life Back: Patients
in Pain Tell Their Story,” presented the pain relief experiences of various patients and
the pain medications, they had been prescribed. The FDA was not aware of this
promotional material tell 2002.46

2003 FDA Warning to Purdue Pharma:
Your journal advertisements omit and minimize the serious safety risks associated with
OxyContin®, and promote it for uses beyond which have been proven safe and effective…your
journal advertisements fail to present in the body of the advertisement critical information
regarding limitations on the indicated use of OxyContin®, thereby promoting OxyContin® for a
much broader range of patients with pain than are appropriate for the drug 47
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Although it was clear that Purdue Pharma violated the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act, the DEA and FDA did not come down hard on Purdue Pharma. A few
advertisements were retracted from JAMA and the package insert for OxyContin was
updated. OxyContin was given a “black-box” package insert which highlights the
significance of negative outcomes in a drug. Although the “black-box” package insert
seemed to be a sweeping change from the previous literature, OxyContin was still FDA
approved to treat non-cancer pain. Even after 2003, Richard Sackler was still able to
use these setbacks to his advantage and promote OxyContin over less powerful opioids
for moderate pain. As a result, overdoses in America began doubling every year.
In 2006, Kirk Orgosky, the Deputy Cheif of the DOJ fraud section wrote a
memorandum suggesting the indictment of Purdue Pharma for mail fraud, wire fraud,
and money laundering. It was leaked to the public as the DOJ decided to push the
indictment aside for unforeseen purposes. Orgosky highlights in detail the illegal
correspondence Purdue Frederick had with Dr.Curtis Wright during OxyContin’s
approval period, stating that Purdue “traveled to the FDA’s location in Rockland,
Maryland in January and February of 1995 and rented a room nearby.” The
memorandum continues to state that it was highly likely that Curtis Wright likely spent
multiple days helping write the safety and efficacy studies for OxyContin. Ogrosky
concludes that Purdue Pharma has been committing fraud since 1992. With the
company making an estimated 100 million dollars a month of OxyContin, “there seems
to be no valid reason” to postpone an indictment. Purdue Pharma wouldn’t be taken to
court for another two years.48
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Minor Justice
When Purdue Pharma was taken to court in 2008, the Sacklers were nowhere to
be seen. Richard Sackler removed himself as President of Purdue Pharma. He would
remain as a co-chairman to avoid as much public and legal scrutiny as possible. When
Purdue Pharma was facing charges for “misbranding” their addictive opioids the
company goal was “to protect the family at all cost.”49 Three fall guys were put in place
to keep the blame off of the Sacklers and void Purdue of as much responsibility. Michael
Friedman, the company’s new president, agreed to pay $19 million in fines; Dr. Paul D.
Goldenheim, its former medical director, agreed to pay $7.5 million; Howard R. Udell, its
top lawyer, agreed to pay $8 million. Purdue Frederick took ownership to the sum of 600
million dollars so Purdue Pharma could continue to do business. OxyContin had already
made 9 billion dollars in sales by 2008 as the fines amounted to more of a “cost of doing
business” than real justice. A month after trial, the Sacklers who sat on the board of
Purdue Pharma decided to gift their own family 325 million dollars from Purdue’s
coffers.50

Conclusion
In 2010 OxyContin became reformulated and the technology in each pill made
the diversion of the drug much more complicated. Doctors once again became
extremely hesitant to prescribe opioids as lawsuits and medical review boards began
threatening to take away licenses. Many patients who were “legally” dependent on
OxyContin were cut off from their supply. In order to avoid withdrawal, patients and
49
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illegal prescription users resorted to buying black market opioids such as heroin and
fentanyl. After 2010, black market opioids became the driving force in the opioid crisis.
Unregulated powerful opioids are much easier for a user to overdose on, the CDC data
below shows a huge increase in black market opioid overdoses (mainly fentanyl today),
as well as a decline in prescription opioid overdoses, post-2010.

Holly Hedegaard, Drug Overdoses Deaths in the United States 1999-2016
Disease Control, 2017), 4, Fig. 4.
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db294.pdf

(NCHS Data Brief: Center for

In 2021 Purdue Pharma and the Sackler family filed for bankruptcy. Many
families who lost loved ones to opioids were worried upon hearing that the Sacklers
were once again getting away with a fine. Although the 2021 fine was initially set at 4.5
billion dollars, the Sacklers had a total estimated 10.7 billion dollars worth. Fortunately,
in December of 2021, U.S. District Judge Colleen McMahon ruled that the bankruptcy
court lacked the authority to release the Sackler from liability. With 800,000 opioid
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deaths since OxyContin’s release in 1996, countless parents and family members are
seeking more than just a fine for one of the deadliest epidemics in American history.
The origin of today’s opioid crisis is uniquely an American problem. The United
States and New Zealand remain the only two countries that allow pharmaceutical
companies to advertise. For much of our history, we have catered to domestic and
foreign pharmaceutical competition, much of which has resulted in the creation of
life-saving drugs. For all of the pharmacutical miracles created in the U.S, there have
been many opportunistic companies such as Purdue Pharma who took advantage of
what can be a compromisable system. In Purdue’s case, the FDA became beholden to
the very multibillion-dollar company they were tasked with regulating.
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